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Harold I. Elbertt 
IX 
535 
TRANSACTIONS NEGATING THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF ADVANCEMENTS 
A. Maintenance and Education of a Child 
M .ANY states have statutes which provide that support, mainte-nance and education of a child will not be considered an ad-
vancement unless the parent intended it as such.384 The Kentucky 
statute is typical and it reads in part as follows: " . . . the maintaining 
or educating or the giving of money, to a child or grandchild without 
any view to a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed an 
advancement."885 Most states do not have statutes of that type but 
by judicial decision reach a result that is in accord with the statutory 
provision just quoted. 386 
I. Where Money is Given for the _Support and Maintenance of 
a Minor Child. Where a child is under legal age and money is given 
him or expended on his behalf for support and maintenance, the 
transaction is not an advancement.387 A parent is under a legal 
obligation to support his child and the presumption is that he intends 
to ful6.ll the duty that society placed on him.388 However, the parent, 
if he so desires, may charge support and maintenance to a minor child 
as an advancement. 389 In Colorado, by virtue of statute, a parent 
cannot, unless he accomplishes the result by will, charge money e."C-
,,. A dissertation su'bmitted to the faculty of the School of Law of the University of 
Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree. Part I was 
pu'blished in March 1953, Vol. 51, pp. 665-704. Part II was pu'blished in December 1953, 
Vol. 52, pp. 231-264. 
t Member, Missouri and Oklahoma Bars.-Ed. 
384.A]a. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §19; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §ll9; Colo. 
Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §6; D.C. Code (1940) §18-707; Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 193'7) 
§ll3-1013; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1933) §6-1504; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §39l.140; Md. 
Ann. Code Gen. Laws (1932) art. 93, §133; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §312; N.Y. 
Decedent's Estate Law (1939) §85; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §6-2505. 
885 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140. 
8BBPaclcard v. Packard, 95 Kan. 644, 149 P. 404 (1915); Bissell v. Bissell, 120 Iowa 
127, 94 N.W. 465 (1903); Taylor v. Taylor, L.R. 20 Eq. 155 (1875). 
3B7Ibid. Cf. Greene v. Greene, 145 Miss. 87, llO S. 218 (1926); Hatfield v. Minet, 
L.R. 8 Ch. Div. 136 (1878). 
888 Notes 386 and 387 supra. 
889Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927). C£. Greene v. Greene, 145 
Miss. 87, no s. 218 (1926). 
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pended for support, maintenance and education of a minor child as 
an advancement. 390 He may, in that state, charge other money he 
has given a minor child as an advancement.391 
Many times a man advanced in years may have minor children and 
desire to give them property for their future support and education. 
Under such circumstances the courts hold that the conveyance is for 
support, maintenance and education and is, therefore, not an advance-
ment.392 
2. Where Money is Given for the Support and Maintenance of 
an Adult Child. A voluntary inter vivos transfer of money from a 
parent to a child for support and maintenance is not given with a view 
toward the establishment of the child in life, and consequently the 
courts hold that it is not an advancement. 393 
As previously pointed out, the statutes in several states provide that 
money given by a parent to a child for support and maintenance shall 
not be deemed an advancement.394 These statutes do not make a 
distinction between minor and adult children and the courts con-
sequently hold that no distinction was intended.395 In Colorado, the 
statute reads: " . . ·. maintenance, education or supply of money to 
a child under the age of majority. . . . "396 In that state, even though 
the child is of age, money he receives from a parent for support and 
maintenance is not presumed to be an advancement.397 
In England, a transfer of money by a parent to a child for the 
latter's support and maintenance is never an advancement. For in-
soopagev. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927). 
39llbid. 
392Packard v. Packard, 95 Kan. 644, 149 P. 404 (1915). In that case a parent 
deeded eighty acres of land to a minor child who had lost three fingers in an accident. At 
the time of the conveyance he stated that he was deeding the land to the child £or an 
education because he couldn't be a fanner. Held, that the value of the eighty acres was 
not an advancement. 
393 Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484 (1881); Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 
(1927); Crain. v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S.W. 67 (1908). In that case a mother 
made advancements of $2000 each to her two daughters. She took care of a son, who was 
of unsound mind, during his adult file. On the parent's death, the daughters contended that 
the money their mother expended on their brother's beha1£ was an advancement. Held, 
that the money so e.,:pended was not an advancement. Carmichael v. Lathrop, 112 Mich. 
301, 70 N.W. 575 (1897). Cf. Hartwell v. Rice, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 587 (1854). In 
that case a father-in-law gave money to a son-in-law to support his insane wife. The son-
in-law executed a receipt for these payments which read as follows: " ••• as a part of her 
portion out of her father's estate." Held, an advancement to the daughter. 
394 Note 384 supra. 
395Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484 (1881); Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 
(1927). 
39s Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176. 
397Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927). . 
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stance in Taylor -v. Taylor,398 the English court held that payments , 
by a father to an adult son from 1833 to 1856 to enable the latter, who 
had entered the church, to live (the sums so given were considerable 
--sometimes as much as 2000 pounds a year) were not advancements. 
In Georgia, by statute, money expended for the support and main-
tenance of an adult child who lives under the paternal roof is not an 
advancement. 399 However, if the money is given to the child for the 
same purpose after he leaves the paternal roof, the presumption is one 
of advancement.400 
3. Education of a Child. a. Ordinary Education. A parent 
is under legal duty to give his children an ordinary education, i.e., high 
school. Consequently, the courts hold that money so expended is in 
fulfillment of that obligation and is not intended as an advancement. 
The authorities are unanimous on that proposition.401 However, if 
the evidence shows that an intestate intended to charge money ex.-
pended for ordinary education of one of ,his minor children as an 
advancement, it will be charged as such.402 
b. College Education. In modem times, more and more parents 
are sending their children to college. We are, therefore, confronted 
with the problem of whether a college education is an advancement. 
In Kentucky, by statute, the intent of the advancer is regarded as 
immaterial and all substantial gifts are advancements. However, a 
proviso of that statute reads as follows: " . . . educating . . . a child 
. . . without any view towards a portion or settlement in life, shall 
not be deemed an advancement."403 Many other states have statutes 
similar to the Kentucky statute.404 The courts, in construing that 
398 L.R. 20 Eq. 155 (1875). But see Hatfield v. Minet, L.R. 8 Ch. Div. 136 (1878). 
399 Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 1937) §113-1013. 
-100 Bowen v. Holland, 184 Ga. 718, 193 S.E. 233 (1939); Neal v. Neal, 153 Ga. 44, 
111 S.E. 387 (1922); Holliday v. Wingfield, 59 Ga. 206 (1877). 
401 Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927); Brannock v. Hamilton, 72 Ky. 
(9 Bush) 446 (1872). In that case the money was expended by a grandparent for tuition 
for the daughter of a deceased son. Garrett v. Colvin, 77 lvliss. 408, 26 S. 963 (1899); 
In re Riddle's Estate, 19 Pa. (7 Harris) 431 (1852). Cf. Brake v. Graham, 214 Ala. IO, 
106 S. 188 (1926). In that case a parent, who was advanced in years, deeded land to the 
minor son of his second marriage. All of his other children had reached maturity, and he 
was solicitous of this one's education. Held, that the transfer was to provide for the child's • 
education and was not an advancement. See also Packard v. Packard, 95 Kan. 644, 149 
P. 404 (1915). 
-102 Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927). 
403 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140. 
404AJa. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §19; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §119; Colo. 
Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §6; D:C. Code (1940) §18-707; Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 1937) 
§113-1013; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-1504; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140; Md. 
Ann. Code Gen. Laws (1939) art. 93, §133; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §312; N.Y. 
Decedent's Estate Law (1939) §85; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §6-2505. 
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statute, hold that money expended by a parent to enable a child to 
get a college education is not an advancement unless intended as 
such.405 All states, whether they have legislation similar to Kentucky 
or not, are in accord with the decisions of that state.406 In South 
Carolina, because an advancement is valued as of the date an intestate 
died, a college education cannot be charged as an advancement. Such 
a method makes valuation impossible and for that reason, the South 
Carolina decisions are justified.407 
The decisions and legislation in other states are not consistent with 
the presumption that all substantial voluntary inter vivos transfers 
from a parent to a child are prima facie advancements. An education 
may be as valuable to the child receiving ·it as a farm is to his brother. 
One may prefer a farm, another a college education: both are ways 
of establishing a child in life. Therefore, the rule that a college 
education is not an advancement is illogical. In addition, our advance-
ment statutes are patterned after the English statute of distributions. 
In that country, the courts hold a college education to be an advance-
ment as it is given with a ·view toward establishing a child in life.408 
B. When a Parent Is Indebted to a Child 
Often a parent may be under legal obligation to a child, i.e., he 
may have borrowed money from him, or he may have held money as 
his guardian. If he, being indebted to the child in the above ways, 
makes a voluntary inter vivos transfer of money or property to him, 
405 Hill's Guardian v. Hill, 122 Ky. 681, 92 S.W. 924 (1906). 
406 Gan:ett v. Colvin, 77 Miss. 408, 26 S. 963 (1899); Bradsher v. Cannady, 76 N.C. 
445 (1877); Miller's Appeal, 40 Pa. (4 Wright) 57 (1861); In re Riddle's Estate, 19 Pa. 
(7 Harris) 431 (1852). Cf. Mitchell's rnsmbutees v. Mitchell, 8 Ala. 414 (1845), and 
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §19. 
407White v. Moore, 23 S.C. 456 (1885); Cooner v. May, 3 Stroh. Eq. (S.C.) 185 
(1848). In that case the court said at 189: "The rule of the statute is that the advancement 
is to be estimated, not at what it cost, nor even at its value when given by the parent, but 
according to its value at the parent's death. No matter whether the Negro which a father 
bestows on his son, cost him much or little; it is the value of such a Negro at the father's 
death which is to be charged to the son. So here, if the education of young May, general 
or professional, is to be considered an advancement, its value is to be estimated by its 
intrinsic worth, and not by the money expended in procuring it. Such is the imperative 
direction of the statute; and I am at a loss for any rule by which a money valuation can 
be placed upon the mental proficiency resulting from education, whether of the one kind 
or the other. 
''The utter absurdity of making the expenses of education the standard of the value 
of the education itself, may be easily demonstrated. Suppose the same sum is expended upon 
two children of manifestly unequal capacity; will each of them. have received an equal 
benefit'?" 
40s Taylor v. Taylor, L.R. 20 Eq. 155 (1875). 
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the presumption is in favor of a satisfaction pro tanto of indebtedness.400 
The courts reached this conclusion on the theory that although a 
debtor can make a gift to a creditor, he would in all probability prefer 
to pay his just obligation:110 The presumption is rebuttable and if 
the parent intended to make an advancement to his child, he may do 
so.411 Where the parent gives the child more than enough money 
to pay the indebtedness, the excess is presumed to be an advance-
ment. 412 
In Hollister v. Attmore,413 an intestate, who was an attorney, drew 
a will for his sister. Under the terms of the will, his son was to inherit 
most of her property. She died before the will was executed, and the 
intestate and another sister inherited her estate. They decided to 
carry out their deceased sister's desires and gave the property to the 
intestate's son. It was held that the value of the property was not an 
advancement to the intestate's son because it was given in fulfillment 
of a moral obligation. 
The case of Hollister 11. Attmore suggests a very interesting prob-
lem. Suppose a parent is indebted to a child but the debt is barred by 
limitations. After the statute has run, he gives the child a sum 
sufficient to pay the indebtedness. On his death intestate can the 
other children charge this to the son as an advancement? If the logic 
of the Hollister case is followed, the rule must be that the payment 
was in satisfaction of a moral obligation and not an advancement. 
C. When a Deed to Property or Money Is Given to a Child 
for Services Rendered 
Often a child may enter into a contract with a parent under the 
terms of which the parent agrees to transfer property to him for services 
to be rendered in the future. On the parent's death intestate, the 
other children may seek to charge the property so received as an ad-
vancement. The rule is well settled that a parent may contract with 
a child and if the conveyance is a result of such an agreement it cannot 
4.09 Patton v. Glover, 1 App. D.C. 466 (1893); Corbin's Exrs. v. Corbin, 302 Ky. 208, 
194 S.W. (2d) 65 (1946); Brooks' Assignee v. Summers, 100 Ky. 620, 38 S.W. 1047 
(1897); Haglar v. McCombs, 66 N.C. 345 (1872); O'Neal v. Dwtlap, 11 Rich Eq. (S.C.) 
405 (1860). 
410 Haglar v. McCombs, 66 N.C. 345 (1872); Corbin's Exrs. v. Corbin, 302 Ky. 208, 
194 s.w. (2d) 65 (1946). 
411 Haglar v. McCombs, supra note 410. 
412 O'Neal v. Dwtlap, 11 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 405 (1860). 
413 58 N.C. (5 Jones Eq.) 373 (1860). 
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be charged as an advancement.414 In Kentucky, however, if the 
evidence discloses that the value of the property received by the child 
was grossly disproportionate to the services rendered, he is charged 
with the difference between the value of the property and the services 
rendered, on the settlement of the parent's estate.416 
Many times a child renders valuable services to a parent over a 
long period .of years, even after he has reached majority. If the latter 
conveys property to the former in consideration of these services, the 
conveyance cannot be charged as an advancement. The courts feel 
that the parent was under a moral obligation to reimburse the child 
and since the property was received in fulfillment of such obligation, 
it should not be charged as a part portion.416 
414Day v. Grubbs, 235 Ky. 741, 32 S.W. (2d) 327 (1930). In that case the consid-
eration for a conveyance by a father to his daughter was the latter's agreement not to marry 
and to care for the former. She performed her part of the contract until he died. Held, 
that the value of the conveyance could not be charged to the daughter as an advancement. 
Because the promise not to marry was part of the contract, the court refused to deduct the 
value of her services from the value of the land. Groom v. Thompson, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 
223, 16 S.W. 389 (1891); Cleaver v. Kirk's Heirs, 60 Ky. (3 Mete.) 270 (1860); Parks 
v. Parks, 19 Md. 323 (1862); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 214 Mich. 12, 182 N.W. 1 (1921); 
Comings v. Wellman, 14 N.H. 286 (1843). ~ that case a father, in consideration of love 
and affection, conveyed land in fee simple to his son. On the same day, the son conveyed 
a life interest in the same land to his parents. The next day, in consideration of the son's 
agreeing to support them, they conveyed their life estate to him. Held, that the value of 
the life estate was not an advancement, but the value of the reversion should be charged 
as such. Jakolette v. Danielson, (N.J. Ch. 1888) 13 A. 850. In that case one son of an 
intestate claimed that his father conveyed land to him in consideration of his promise not 
to go to California. The transfer occurred twelve years after the promise. During that 
period the son managed his father's farm on shares. Held, that the evidence ,vas insufficient 
to rebut the presumption of advancement. In re Allen's Estate, 207 Pa. 325, 56 A. 928 
(1904). 
4tuDay v. Grubbs, 235 Ky. 741, 32 S.W. (2d) 327 (1930); McCray v. Com, 168 
Ky. 457, 182 S.W. 640 (1916); Ford v. Thompson, 58 Ky. (1 Mete.) 580 (1859); 
Gordon's Heirs v. Gordon, 58 Ky. (I Mete.) 285 (1858). 
410 Day v. Grubbs, 235 Ky. 741, 32 S.W. (2d) 327 (1930); Mumford v. Mumford, 
(Mo. App. 1917) 194 S.W. 898; Lisles v. Huffman, 88 Mo. App. 143 (1901). In that case a 
parent, on the same day, deeded eighty acres of land to each of his sons and forty acres to each 
of his daughters. The deeds to the sons recited a consideration of ten dollars each and the deeds 
to the daughters recited a consideration of five dollars each. Shortly after making the 
conveyance, the father said that he gave the sons more because after reaching their majority 
they stayed on the farm and helped him. Held, that the conveyances were not advance-
ments. Hattersley v. Bissett, 51 N.J. Eq. 597, 29 A. 187 (1894); Weaver's Appeal, 63 
Pa. (13 P.F. Smith) 309 (1869); Stem's Estate, 3 Pa. Dist. 369 (1894); Beakhurst v. 
Crumbley, 18 R.I. 689, 30 A. 453, 31 A. 753 (1894); Murrel v. Murrel, 2 Streb. Eq. 
(S.C.) 148 (1848); McElroy v. Barkley, (Tenn. Ch. 1899) 58 S.W. 406; Johnson v. 
Patterson, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 626 (1884). In that case Andrew Johnson, a former 
president, handed an envelope to his daughter, Mrs. Patterson, and told her not to open it 
until she reached home. When she opened it she found a deed to the farm on which she 
was living. Two years before the conveyance, Johnson told a friend that he was greatly 
indebted to Mrs. Patterson for her services at Washington. "She had shown great self 
denial," he said, and "her care and economy" had saved him much money. He added: 
" ... In the course of my business I have become the owner of the farm on which she now 
resides, and I intend for her to have it as some compensation for her services rendered 
1954] &v.ANCEMENTS 541 
D. Burden of Proof 
The burden of proving that a transfer of property is an advance-
ment rests in the fust instance on the party asserting such fact. In 
order to meet this burden, he must prove a voluntary inter vivos trans-
fer and an intent on the part of the transferor to charge the transaction 
as an advancement or facts giving rise to the presumption of advance-
ment. When he has done this, he has met the burden and the pre-
sumption of advancement rises. The burden then shifts to the pur-
ported advancee and he must introduce evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption.417 Courts, on numerous occasions, have stated that the 
burden of proving that a transfer is not an advancement is on the 
advancee.418 From our previous discussion we see that such a state-
ment is confusing and misleading. This is caused by the failure of 
the courts to distinguish between (I) the necessity of proving a 
voluntary transfer and (2) the necessity of rebutting the presumption 
of advancement. The proper analysis of the problem is illustrated 
by the case of Stephens v. Smith.419 In that case, a mother who had 
been living with her daughter for fifteen months gave her a check for 
$300. On the mother's death intestate, the other heirs claimed that 
the $300 should be charged as an advancement. The court held that 
before the $300 could be charged to the daughter as a part portion, 
during my administration." The court held this evidence insufficient to show that the 
conveyance was in payment of a moral obligation and charged the property to her as an 
ad\'ancement. Watkins v. Young, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 84 (1878). Cf. Rowe v. Rowe, 144 
Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1926). 
417 Clements Admr. v. Hood, 57 Ala. 459 (1876); Stauffer v. Martin, 43 Ind. App. 
675, 88 N.E. 363 (1909); Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md. 72 (1862); Pilkington v. Wheat, 330 
Mo. 767, 51 S.W. (2d) 42 (1932). In that case an intestate deeded property to his son 
for a recited consideration of $1000. Held, that where a deed recites a consideration the 
burden of proof is on the party claiming advancement. By that, the court meant that where 
the one claiming advancement proves (1) the deed was given without consideration or 
(2) that the consideration was inadequate, the burden of proof shifts to the grantee to 
show that the transaction was an absolute gift rather than an advancement. Lynch v. Culver, 
260 Mo. 495, 168 S.W. 1138 (1914). In that case the grantee in a deed admitted that 
the recited consideration had not been paid. Held, that the burden of proof was on the 
purported advancee to show that the transaction was not an advancement. Ray v. Loper, 
65 Mo. 470 (1877); Waddell v. Waddell, 87 Mo. App. 216 (1901). 
418 Sewell v. Everett, 57 Fla. 529, 49 S. 187 (1909). In that case the deed recited a 
consideration of love and affection and $1. Bowen v. Holland, 184 Ga. 718, 193 S.E. 223 
(1939); Ruch Admr. v. Biery, 110 Ind. 444, 11 N.E. 312 (1887); In re Manatt's Trust, 
214 Iowa 432, 239 N.W. 524 (1931). In that case the Iowa court pointed out that only 
a slight amount of evidence is required to rebut the presumption of advancement. In re 
Palmer's Estate, 194 Iowa 611, 190 N.W. 30 (1922); Miller v. Richardson, (Mo. Supp. 
1935) 85 S.W. (2d) 41; Kiger v. Terry, 119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896); Johnson v. 
Patterson, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 626 (1884). 
410 127 Mo. App. 18, 106 S.W. 533 (1907). 
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the parties claiming the transfer was an advancement must prove 
that the money was received as a gift. The court stated that before 
the amount could be charged as an advancement they would be com-
pelled to build presumption on presumption: (1) that the daughter 
actually received and used the money; (2) that it was not given her 
in payment of a debt; (3) that it was not intended as a gift but as an 
advancement and that to reach an ultimate fact by such a process 
would be violative of the rule that a legal presumption must always rest 
on a fact and not on another presumption. 
If, in Stephens v. Smith, the parties alleging advancements had 
proved a voluntary inter vivas transfer, they would have met their 
burden and then the burden would have been on the purported 
advancee to show that the transaction was an absolute gift. The fact 
that she received the $300 standing alone is not sufficient to show that 
the money was received as a gift. 
The case of Stephens v. Smith is correct Prima facie, a child is 
entitled to a full share of his parent's estate. Therefore the burden 
of proving that he received part of his share in the parent's lifetime 
rests on the party alleging such to be the fact. When the party shows 
that he did receive a gift of property under' circumstances giving rise 
to the presumption of advancement, the rule that a parent intended 
to treat all of his children alike comes into play, and the child has the 
burden of proving that the parent intended an absolute gift.420 
X 
CHANGE OR REvocATioN 
A. Change of an Advancement to a Debt or Trust 
When a parent buys property in the name of a child or gives the 
child money or pays the latter's debt, the courts presume the trans-
action is an advancement rather than a debt or a resulting trust. 421 
If the parent desires to charge the transaction as a debt or resulting 
trust it is essential that the intent to do so be expressed at the time 
the transaction takes place. Subsequent declarations made in the 
presence of the child are not admissible to prove that he intended to 
charge a debt or resulting trust.422 
420 Stephens v. Smith, 127 Mo. App. 18, 106 S.W. 533 (1907). 
421Stacy v. Stacy, 175 Ark. 763, 300 S.W. 437 (1927); Robinson v. Robinson, 45 
Ark. 481 (1885); Page v. Page, 8 N.H. 187 (1836); Thompson's Heirs v. Thompson's 
Devisees, l Yerg. (Temi.) 97 (1826). 
422Higham v. Vanosdol, 125 Ind. 74, 25 N.E. 140 (1890); Merkel's Appeal, 89 Pa. 
340 (1879); O'Neal v. Breecheen, 64 Tenn. (5 Baxt.) 604 (1875). 
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Once an advancement has been made, the parent and child cannot 
change it into a debt or resulting trust unless a new consideration 
passes between the pai:ties.423 In several cases the child received an 
advancement from his parent and subsequently gave the parent a 
mortgage because creditors were about to levy on his property. In 
all of these cases the courts hold that the mortgage, since it was given 
without consideration, is void as to creclitors.424 
B. Change of an Advancement to an Absolute Gift 
An advancer can change an advancement to an absolute gift. Since 
such an act is beneficial to the advancee his acceptance is presumed 
and he need not assent to the change.425 To prove that an advance-
ment has been converted to an absolute gift, ex parte declarations of 
the advancer are admissible as declarations against interest. 426 In 
jurisdictions which require an advancement to be evidenced by a 
,vriting, the deliberate destruction of it by the advancor converts the 
advancement to an absolute gift.427 However, if the writing is in-
advertently destroyed or lost, the courts would undoubtedly hold that 
secondary evidence is admissible to prove that a child had received an 
advancement. Where the advancor charges advancements in a book 
of accounts which was_ always in his possession, but marks or tears 
out pages where advancements are charged, the courts presume that 
they have been converted into absolute gifts.428 
In Adams 11. Adams,429 an heir released his e:,,.'Pectancy to his 
father. Subsequently they agreed that he should receive a child's 
share of the estate. The court ruled that a release of expectancy is 
a contract and cannot be rescinded by mere oral declarations. That 
decision seems to be erroneous. A parent should be entitled to con-
vert such an obligation to an absolute gift if he so desires. Since the 
doctrine is applicable only to situations where the advancor dies in-
423 Harper v. Parks, 63 Ga. 705 (1869); Blume v. Krucheberg, 112 Ind. App. 390, 
44 N.E. (2d) 1010 (1942). 
424Higham v. Vanosdol, 125 Ind. 74, 25 N.E. 140 (1890); Dammets v. Croft, Ill 
N.J. Eq. 462, 162 A. 734 (1932). 
425Wallace v. Owen, 71 Ga. 544 (1876); In re Bugbee's Will, 92 Vt. 175, 102 A. 
484 (1917); Wheeler v. Wheeler's Estate, 47 Vt. 637 (1874). 
426 Wallace v. Owen, supra note 425; Wheeler v. Wheeler's Estate, supra note 425. 
427Hartwell v. Rice, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 587 (1854); Wheeler v. Wheeler's Estate, 
47 Vt. 637 (1874); Oller v. Bonebrake, 65 Pa. St. (15 P.F. Smith) 338 (1870). In that 
case the court held that the advancor must be of sound mind at the time he changes an 
advancement to an absolute gift. 
428 Marshall v. Coleman, 187 m. 556, 58 N.E. 628 (1900); Hartwell v. Rice, 67 
Mass. (l Gray) 587 (1854). 
429 82 W.Va. 244, 95 S.E. 859 (1918). 
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testate, an advancement becomes an absolute gift where the advancor 
dies testate. 430 
C. Change of an Absolute Gift to an Advancement 
When a parent has given a child property as an absolute gift it 
cannot be revoked and made an advancement by the ex parte declara-
tions of the parent431 or by entries in a book of accounts.432 A parent 
and child cannot agree that an absolute gift be charged as an advance-
ment unless a new consideration passes between them.433 However, 
a parent can charge an absolute gift as an advancement by so providing 
in his will.434 Under such circumstances the law of advancements 
is not applicable. The court is merely construing the will and carrying 
out the intent of the testator. 
D. Change of a Debt to an Advancement 
In several cases, heirs have claimed that their intestate had con-
verted a debt into an advancement. A child may make such a claim 
because his father died testate, thereby wiping out advancements. The 
other heirs may claim that a debt was changed to an advancement be-
cause the statute of limitations had run on the obligation.430 
The law is well settled that a debt can be changed to an advance-
ment (1) by agreement of the parties,436 or (2) by a writing given 
by the parent to the child and assented to by the latter,437 or (3) by 
a writing signed by the child and assented to by the parent, 438 or ( 4) 
by acts of the parent which destroy the legal obligations, i.e., where 
the parent gives the note evidencing the indebtedness to the child.430 
430 Kuhne v. Gau, 138 Minn. 34, 163 N.W. 982 (1917). 
431 Sherwood v. Smith, 23 Conn. 516 (1855); O'Neal v. Breecheen, 64 Tenn. (5 
Baxt.) 604 (1875). 
432 Sherwood v. Smith, supra note 431. 
433 Kuhne v. Gau, 138 Minn. 34, 163 N.W. 982 (1917). 
434Jn re Hayne's Estate, 165 Cal. 568, 133 P. 277 (1913); Brunson v. Hemy, 140 
Ind. 455, 39 N.E. 256 (1894); Albrecht v. Fisher, 14 Ohio App. 195 (1921). Cf. Pole 
v. Simmons, 45 Md. 246 (1876). 
435 Appeal of Melony, 78 Conn. 334, 62 A. 151 (1905); Olney v. Brown, 163 Mich. 
125, 128 N.W. 241 (1910); In re Buchanan's Estate, 2 Chester Co. Rep. (Pa.) 74 (1883). 
Cf. Levering v. Rittenhouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 130 (1839). 
436 Lindsay v. Platt, 9 Fla. 150 (1860). In that case a father-in-law and son-in-law 
agreed that a debt of the latter was to be charged as an advancement to the fonner's 
daughter. Farmer's Exchange Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 256 Ky. 160, 75 S.W. (2d) 
1063 (1934). 
437 Cf. Hayes v. Welling, 30 R.I. 553, 96 A. 843 (1916). 
43Sibid. 
439 In re Weaver's Estate, 5 Lane. Bar. No. 35 (Orph. Ct. Pa.) (1874); Haverstock 
v. Sarbach, 1 W. and S. (Pa.) 390 (1841); Garney v. Garney, 4 Ky. L. Rep. (Abstract) 
1954] AnVANCElv.tENTS 545 
Courts are reluctant to admit in evidence ex parte declarations of 
the parent made out of the presence of the child.· For that reason a 
statement that a debt is to be charged as an advancement is not ad-
missible in evidence and when admitted is never sufficient evidence 
to change the character of the transaction.440 In states which require 
an advancement to be charged in writing the ex parte declarations of 
the parent are not admissible to prove that a debt is an advancement.441 
If a parent sues a child to collect a debt, such declarations are 
admissible in evidence as declarations against interest. However, the 
statement is not sufficient evidence to prevent recovery.442 
A debt can be changed to an advancement by will even though 
it is barred by limitations.~43 
622 (1883). But see In re Bennington, 67 Misc. 363, 124 N.Y.S. 829 (1910). In that 
case a son received money from his father. The transaction was evidenced by interest-
bearing notes. Over a period of severol years the son paid interest and possibly part of the 
principal. The father later sunendered the note to the son. Held, that the sunender of 
the notes by a parent to the child was intended to change the debt to an absolute gift. 
440 Appeal of Melony, 78 Conn. 334, 62 A. 151 (1905); Denman v. McMahin, 37 
Ind. 241 (1871); In re Buchanan's Estate, 2 Chester Co. Rep. (Pa.) 74 (1883); Levering 
v. Rittenhouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 130 (1839); In re Weaver's Estate, 5 Lane. Bar. (Pa.) 
24 (1887); Miller's Appeal, 40 Pa. (4 Wright) 57, 80 Am. Dec. 555 (1861); Porter v. 
Allen, 3 Pa. 390 (1846); Haverstock v. Sarbach, 1 W. & S. (Pa.) 390 (1841); Garner v. 
Taylor, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900) 58 S.W. 758; Arnold v. Barrow's E."<r., 2 Pat. & H. (Va.) 
l (1856). 
441 Olney v. Brown, 163 Mich. 125, 128 N.W. 241 (1910). 
442Denman v. McMahin, 37 Ind. 241 (1871); Haverstock v. Sarbach, l W. & S. 
(Pa.) 390 (1841); Arnold v. Banow's E."<r., 2 Pat. & H. (Va.) l (1856). Cf. In re Dewee's 
Estate, 3 Brewst. 314, 7 Phila. (Pa. Orph. Ct.) 498 (1896). In that case a father held a 
judgment for $2000 against his son. Although the judgment was not paid, he satisfied it 
of record. The son was not present when this oceutted. Held, that a parent cannot, by 
release of judgment:, without the consent of his child, change a debt to an advancement. 
The court seemed to think that if this could be accomplished it would be a method of 
circumventing the statute of limitations. But see Appeal of Kirby, 109 Pa. 41 (1885), 
where a daughter received over $1000 from her father and the latter took notes from her 
for this amount. Later, the father subscribed a paper saying that the note was an advance-
ment. Apparently, the daughter was unaware of the existence of this paper. Held, that 
the acknowledgment signed by the parent was sufficient to show that he intended to change 
the debt to an advancement. 
443 In re Palmer's Estate, 194 Iowa 611, 190 N.W. 30 (1922); York v. York, 187 
Miss. 465, 193 S. 330 (1940); Hanssen v. Karbe, (Mo. App. 1938) !IS S.W. (2d) 109; 
Wentworth v. Wentworth, 75 N.H. 547, 78 A. 646 (1910); In re Gowan's Estate, 285 
Pa. 219, 131 A. 727 (1926); In re Knight's Estate, 253 Pa. 290, 98 A. 558 (1916); Jones 
v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 237, 43 S.W. (2d) 205 (1931); Wyatt v. Wyatt, (Tex. Civ. App. 
1945) 188 s.w. (2d) 685. 
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XI 
RIGHTS .AND LIABILITIES OF THE p .AB.TIES 
A. Rights of the Advancee 
[ Vol. 52 
The recipient of an advancement acquires the same title the ad-
vancor has. If the property received by the advancee is mortgaged, he 
takes subject to the mortgage.444 
B. Rights and Liabilities of a Third Person 
Often an heir is in need of money and on his parent's death sells 
his interest in the estate to a third person. Other heirs may seek to 
charge advancements against the child selling his interest and the 
purchaser may claim they are not chargeable. However, the rule is 
universal that the purchaser takes only the title of the heir and this 
interest can be defeated by showing advancements.445 The reasons 
for the rule are (1) that a person can sell only property which he 
owns, and (2) if the purchaser were permitted to take free and clear 
of the advancement, a child could defeat the purpose of the statute 
by disposing of his interest in the estate.446 
The above rule applies even though the purchaser did not know 
of the advancements at the time of the purchase.447 Conversely, a 
purchaser from an heir stands in the latter's position and can compel 
the other children to account for advancements.448 
C. Rights of Creditors 
Often a child is in debt to his father or has received an advance-
ment from him. He may also owe money to creditors who seek to 
444 Cf. Logan v. Ryan, 78 Cal. App. 448, 229 P. 993 (1924); Cox v. A.P. Green 
Fire Brick Co., 230 Mo. App. 774, 75 S.W. (2d) 621 (1934); Mw:phy v. Nathans, 46 
Pa. (IO Wright) 508 (1864). In that case one Michael Mw:phy entered into an agree-
ment to purchase land from plaintiff. He had plaintiff execute a deed to one Woodside 
who gave her a mortgage for $1000. The mortgage was never recorded. Nine days later 
Woodside conveyed the land to defendant, Mw:phy's wife. Defendant's mother paid 
Woodside for the property. Although her mother did not know of the unrecorded mort-
gage, defendant did. Plaintiff foreclosed the mortgage, purchased the property at execution 
sale, and sued defendant in ejectment. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to judgment. 
Defendant was deemed the purchaser even though her mother paid the purchase price. 
445Bamett v. Thomas, 36 Ind. App. 441, 75 N.E. 868 (1905); Corbitt, v. Wright, 
120 Va. 471, 91 S.E. 612 (1917). 
446 Finch v. Garrett, 102 Iowa 381, 71 N.W. 429 (1897); City National Bank of 
San Saba v. Penn, (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) 92 S.W. (2d) 532. 
447Russell v. Smith, 115 Iowa 261, 88 N.W. 361 (1901); Corbitt v. Wright, 120 
Va. 471, 91 S.E. 612 (1917). 
448 Nicholson v. Caress, 59 Ind. 39 (1877). 
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levy on his interest in his father's estate. If the transaction is an 
advancement, the estate is entitled to priority over the child's creditors. 
If it is a debt, some states hold that a creditor who reduces his claim 
to judgment before the executor or administrator takes priority over 
the estate insofar as real estate is concemed.449 The reasons for these 
decisions are (I) that real estate passed directly to the heirs or devisees 
and not the executor or administrator, and (2) that the probate court 
has no jurisdiction over real estate.460 Other states hold that the estate 
is always entitled to priority even if real estate is involved.451 
A creditor, even though he is not a party to the proceedings, is 
bound by the determination of the probate court that a gift is an 
advancement, since the court has jurisdiction to determine the interest 
of each party in the estate of the deceased person.462 
Where a parent gives a child property in his lifetime and it is 
properly classified as an advancement a creditor of the child can reach 
the property immediately.453 
In Higham v. V anosdol,464 a parent purchased property for his son. 
There was no agreement that the son should pay him for it. Sub-
sequently a law suit was instituted against the son. While the suit 
was pending, the son, ostensibly to secure the purchase price of the 
land bought by the father in the son's name, gave his father a mortgage 
on the property. The court held the mortgage void as to creditors. 
The court pointed out that the transaction was an advancement and 
that the execution of the mortgage, without the intervention of some 
new consideration, could not convert the transaction to a debt. 406 
A parent may take title to property in a child's name or transfer 
440 Comer v. Shehee, 129 Ala. 588, 30 S. 95 (1901); Home Mixture Guano Co. v. 
McKoone, 168 Ga. 317, 147 S.E. 711 (1929); Dyer v. Armstrong, 5 Ind. 437 (1854); 
Hickey v. Davidson, 129 Iowa 384, 105 N.W. 678 (1906); Veatch's Admr. v. Loverett, 
265 Ky. 532, 97 S.W. (2d) 47 (1936); Johnson v. Hoyle, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 56 (1859); 
Butler v. Lollar, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 199 S.W. 1176; Franke v. Lone Star Brewing 
Co., 17 Tex. Civ. App. 9, 42 S.W. 861 (1897); Liginger v. Field, 78 Wis~ 367, 47 N.W. 
613 (1890). Cf. Gary v. Newton, 201 m. 170, 66 N.E. 267 (1903); Sylvanus v. Pruett, 
36 N.M. 112, 9 P. (2d) 142. In that case an advancement charged by will was held 
superior to the rights of creditors of the devisee. 
450 Meppen v. Meppen, 392 m. 30, 63 N.E. (2d) 755 (1945); Proctor v. Newhall, 
17 Mass. 81 (1820); Steele v. Friaxson, 85 Tenn. 430, 3 S.W. 649 (1887); Mann v. 
Mann, 59 Tenn. (12 Heisk.) 245 (1873). 
461 Stenson v. H. S. Halverson Co., 28 N.D. 151, 147 N.W. 800 (1914); In re 
Homstra's Estate, 55 S.D. 513, 226 N.W. 740 (1929). 
452 Comer v. Shehee, 129 Ala. 588, 30 S. 95 (1901). 
463 Bamett v. Branch. Bank at Mobile, 22 Ala. 642 (1853); Pearson v. Cuthbert, 58 
App. Div. 395, 68 N.Y.S. 1031 (1901). 
m 125 Ind. 74, 25 N.E. 140 (1890). 
41iu Dammers v. Croft, 111 N.J. Eq. 462, 162 A. 734 (1932); Roland v. Schrack, 29 
Pa. (5 Casey) 125 (1858). 
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property to a child for the purpose of avoiding existing or future 
creditors. Such a transfer is void as to existing creditors if he is in-
solvent or rendered insolvent by the transfer.456 An existing or future 
creditor may also avoid a transfer of this type by showing that t;he 
transaction was intended as a resulting trust rather than an advance-
ment.457 
XII 
AccmINTING FOR AnvANcEMENTS 
A. The Hotchpot Doctrine 
The courts and textwriters often state that the recipient of an 
advancement must bring property so received into hotchpot.468 In 
that connection some courts and textwriters also state that the advancee 
must elect to bring property into hotchpot before he is entitled to a 
share of the advancor's estate.459 
At common law the doctrine of hotchpot applied only to gifts in 
frankmarriage.460 In Thomas' Coke, the writer defines hotchpot as 
follows: 
"And it seemeth that this word (hotch-pot) is in English a 
pudding; for in this pudding is not commonly put one thing alone, 
but one thing with other things together. And therefore it be-
hooveth in this case to put the lands given in frankmarriage with 
the other lands in hotch-pot, if the husband and wife will have 
any part in the other lands."461 
In Blackstone's Commentaries,462 the writer, in commenting on 
the above definition, said: 
'' . . . By this housewifely metaphor our ancestors meant to 
inform us, that the lands, both those given in frank-marriage and 
those descending in fee simple, should be mixed and blended to-
gether, and then divided in equal portions among all the daugh-
ters. But this was left to the choice of the donee in frank.-
marriage; and if she did not choose to put her lands into hotchpot, 
456 Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St. 1 (1852); Hamilton v. Bradley, 6 Tenn. (5 
Hayw.) 127 (1818). Cf. Nonvood Admx. v. Cobb, 37 Tex. 141 (1873). 
457Bay v. Cook, 31 ID. 336 (1863). Cf. Barth. v. Severson, 191 Iowa 770, 183 N.W. 
617 (1921). 
458 Damron v. Bartley, 302 Ky. 83, 194 S.W. (2d) 73 (1946); 1 &r. Jtm., Advance-
ments §80, p. 747 (1936). 
459Ibid. 
4G0Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 (1852). 
4611 Con's FmST I°NsnT£ITES *721; Co. Lrrr. *176 (a) §§267, 268. 
462 2 B~CKST. Co:r.n.r. *190. 
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she was presumed to be sufficiently provided for, and the rest of 
the inheritance was divided among her other sisters. . . ." 
Blackstone stated that he would hardly have mentioned this law 
of hotchpot had not this method of distribution been revived and 
copied by the statute of distributions.463 
However, the word "hotchpot" does not appear in the English 
statute464 or in the advancement statutes of most American juris-
dictions. It does appear in the advancement statutes of Arizona, 
Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia,465 
and the District of Columbia statute on advancements of real estate,4°0 
but does not appear in the District of Columbia statute on advance-
ments of personal property.467 
Under the common law doctrine of hotchpot, the donee in frank-
marriage returned the property she received to the estate.468 There-
fore, the property was, in effect, valued according to its worth at the 
death of the parent. In England and all American jurisdictions, except 
Connecticut, Iowa, and South Carolina, advancements are valued as 
of the date when made.400 Therefore, an advancee cannot return to 
the estate the identical property received by him.470 The value of the 
property received by him is deducted from his share of the estate. In 
the District of Columbia, by statute, the advancee may return to the 
estate real property received as an advancement or account for its 
value.471 
Even in those jurisdictions where the statute uses the term "hotch-
pot" the advancee does not return to the estate the actual property 
received. He is required to account for its value at the time of trans-
fer.472 In those jurisdictions the advancee must elect to come into the 
403 Id. at lj'l91. 
404 22 and 23 Charles II, c. 10 (1670). 
465 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §39-107; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §223; Miss. 
Code. Ann. (1942) §475; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §311; Te.'!:. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
(1948) art. 2576; Va. Code Ann. (1950) §64-17; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §4094. That 
word was formerly used in the statutes of Florida, Illinois and Kentucky; Lindsley v. 
Mc!ver, 57 Fla. 466, 48 S. 628 (1909); Courter v. Courter, 283 lli. 127, 119 N.E. 63 
(1918); Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 61, §15; Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 75, §28. 
406 D.C. Code (1940) §18-808. 
467 Id., §18-707. 
408 Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 (1852). 
460 Part XIlI, "Valuation of Advancements," infra. 
470 Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 (1852). 
471D.C. Code (1940) §18-808. That statute reads in part: " ••• such advancement, 
or the value thereof. ••• " 
472 Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §475; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1948) art. 2576; 
Lindsley v. Mc!ver, 57 Fla. 466 at 467, 48 S. 628 (1909). In that case the court said: 
"Hotchpot is the bringing into the estate of an intestate an estimate of the value of ad-
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division and distribution of t;he estate.473 The same rule applies in 
Alabama where the statute sets forth a method of election.474 
In Damron 11. Bartley,415 the Kentucky court, relying on American 
Jurisprudence, discussed the necessity of the advancee electing to come 
into hotchpot even though the statute of that state does not have such 
a requirement. The American Jurisprudence article cited by that case 
reads as follows: 
"Generally speaking, before the doctrine of hotchpot may be 
invoked in dealing with advancements, the donor must die intes-
tate, leaving property by descent or subject to distribution, and 
the donee must elect to bring his advancement into hotchpot with 
the other heirs and distributees."476 
The writer of that article relied on the case of Grattan 11. Grattan,411 
decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1852. That case ruled 
that the advancee had to make an election before he was entitled to 
participate in the division and distribution of the advancor's estate. 
The Illinois statute, at the time of that decision, used the word ''hotch-
pot." However, in 1872 it was amended and an election is no longer 
necessary.478 
The American Jurisprudence article is confusing and misleading. 
The only states which require an advancee to elect to participate in 
the division and distribution of an advancor's estate are those which 
use the word "hotchpot" in their advancement statutes and Alabama, 
where the statutes set out a method of election. In most states, since 
an advancement is considered a part of the advancor's estate for the 
purpose of division and distribution, the administrator charges advance-
vancements made by the intestate to hls or her children, in order that the whole may be 
divided in accordance with the statute 0£ descents. When those who have received advance-
ments decline to bring the same into hotchpot when legally required to do so, they may in 
proper proceedings be excluded •••• " Grattan v. Grattan, 18 ID. (8 Peck) 167 (1856); 
Gowan v. Gowan, (Miss. 1892) 12 S. 29; Elliott v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739 
(1889); Ray v. Loper, 65 Mo. 470 (1877); McCoy v. McCoy, 105 Va. 829, 54 S.E. 995 
(1906); Hudson v. Hudson's E.'\T., 3 Rand. (Va.) 117 (1824). 
473 Lindsley v. Mciver, 57 Fla. 466, 48 S. 628 (1909); In re St. Vrain's Estate, 1 
Mo. App. 294 (1876); Flesher v. Mitchell, 5 W.Va. 59 (1871). 
474AJa. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §21 et seq.; May v. May, 15 Ala. 177 (1849); 
Andrews Admr. v. Hall, 15 Ala. 85 (1848); Taylor v. Reese Admr., 4 Ala. 121 (1842). 
475 302 Ky. 83, 194 S.W. (2d) 73 (1946). The previous Kentucky statute used the 
word "hotchpot." Note 465 supra. In the following cases, decided under the old statute, 
the advancee was compelled to elect. Stone's Admr. v. Halley, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 197 
(1833); Haden v. Haden's Heirs, 30 Ky. Q. J. Marshall) 168 (1832); Quinn v. Stockton, 
12 Ky. (2 Little) 343 (1822). 
476 l &r.. Jmt., Advancements §79, p. 747 (1936). 
47718 Ill. (8 Peck) 167 (1856). C£. Barnes v. Hazleton, 50 Ill. 429 (1869). 
478 Courter v. Courter, 283 ID. 127, 119 N.E. 63 (1918). 
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ments to advancees in a petition or motion for an order of distribution. 
The purported advancee can take exception to the petition or motion 
and the probate court then determines whether the transaction is an 
advancement or an absolute gift.479 Also, if one child sues his brothers 
and sisters to partition real estate, any of the parties to the action can 
show advancements and the value of the advancement, if any, is taken 
into account in determining the rights of the parties to the real estate.480 
Since the old common law doctrine of hotchpot is different from 
the modern method of requiring advancees to account for advance-
ments, the courts should refrain from using the word. Use of the 
word tends to create confusion with respect to valuation, to whether 
the advancee must return to the advancor's estate the actual property 
received, and to the necessity of an election. In jurisdictions where 
the statute uses the term, the courts should point out that the purpose 
of the word is to require the advancee to elect whether he desires to 
participate in the division and distribution of the advancor's estate. 
B. Time for Election 
Earlier, we noticed that some jurisdictions require an advancee to 
elect whether he desires to participate in the distribution of the ad-
vancor' s estate. In those states the courts require the election to be 
made within a reasonable time.481 Before an election is required, the 
advancee must have full knowledge of the value of the estate.482 If 
an action is instituted to partition part of the advancor' s real estate, 
the advancee may elect not to come in because his advancement is 
more than his proportionate share of that part of the estate. For that 
reason he is not barred from electing to participate in an action to par-
tition another part of the advancor' s real estate.483 When the purported 
advancee claims the transaction was not an advancement, he is not 
compelled to elect until the question has been determined by the 
court.484 If a minor or a person of unsound mind has received an 
advancement, a guardian must be appointed to make an election for 
him.485 
479Nelson v. Nelson, 90 Mo. 460, 2 S.W. 413 (1886). 
480 Gibson v. Johnson, 331 Mo. 1198, 56 S.W. (2d) 783 (1932); Pilkington v. 
Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51 S.W. (2d) 42 (1932). 
481 Grattan v. Grattan, 18 ill. (8 Peck) 167 (1856). 
482 Hamer v. Hamer, 4 Strob. Eq. (S.C.) 124 (1850). 
483 Belle v. Brown, 37 Ore. 588, 61 P. 1024 (1900); Persinger v. Simmons, 25 Gratt. 
(Va.) 238 (1874); Knight v. Oliver, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 33 (1855). 
484Ladd v. Stephens, 147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 915 (1898). 
485 Andrews Admr. v. Hall, 15 Ala. 85 (1848); Grattan v. Grattan, 18 ill. (8 Peck) 
167 (1856). Cf. Barnes v. Hazleton, 50 ill. 429 (1869). 
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Since an advancee does not return to the estate the actual property 
received, and sincp if he has received more than his share of the estate 
he need not account for the excess, an election to participate in the 
estate should always be made. 
C. Property to be Accounted For 
In its origin the doctrine of advancements made no distinction 
between real and personal property except that the heir at law, because 
of the feudal rule of primogeniture, did not have to account for ad-
vancements in real property. Under present statutes, all children, 
including the oldest son, must account for all advancements.486 
In most states, by statute, the value of an advancement made in 
real estate is considered as part of the real estate, and the value of an 
advancement made in personal property is considered as part of the 
personal estate. An advancement in real estate is deducted fust from 
the real estate, but if the advancement exceeds the value of the real 
estate, it is qeducted from the advancee's share of the personal estate. 
Likewise, an advancement in personal property is deducted first from 
the personal property and if it exceeds the advancee's share of the 
personal estate, it is deducted from the advancee's share of real estate.487 
The reason for the rule is that title to real estate passes directly to the 
heirs and can be divided only by agreement or partition,488 while the 
personal property passes to the administrator.489 Another possible rea-
son is that in most states probate courts do not have jurisdiction over 
the real estate of a deceased person.490 
In many states the statute provides that where an advancement 
has been made in real estate or personal estate or both, it is considered 
as a part of the estate of the decedent.491 Under a statute of that type 
486 Part V, "Property Subject to Advancement," 51 M:rOH. L. REv. 696 (1953). 
487 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §16; D.C. Code (1940) §18-707; D.C. Code 
(1940) §18-808; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §6; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178 
(159); Ivlinn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.531; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-114; N.Y. De-
cedent's Estate Law (1939) §§85, 86; Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-21; Ore. 
Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-303; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§8402a, 8403; 
Vt. Stat. (1947) §3068; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1350; Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.26; 
First Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 220 Ala. 654, 127 S. 221 (1930); Terry v. Dayton, 31 
Barb. (N.Y.) 519 (1860); Hicks v. Gildersleeve, 4 Abb. Prac. (N.Y.) 1 (1856); Melvin 
v. Bullard, 82 N.C. 33 (1855); Appeal of Fleming, 5 Phila. (Pa.) 351 (1863). Cf. Del. 
Rev. Code (1935) §§3752, 3851; ill. Ann. Stat. (1947) c. 3, §166; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
(1943) §29-1, sub. 2. 
488 33 C.J.S., E."ecutors and Administrators §252, p. 1262 (1942). 
489 Id., §299, :p. 1341. 
400 Cf. Elliott v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739 (1889). 
491Arlz. Code Ann. (1939) §39-107; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §ll6; Cal. 
Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1051; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §223; Conn. Gen. 
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the value of an advancement is deducted from either the real or 
personal estate and if it exceeds the real or personal estate, it is deducted 
from the other.492 On the distribution of the personal estate, the 
probate court, although it does not have jurisdiction over land, has the 
power to deduct the value of an advancement in real estate from the 
advancee's share of the personal estate.493 
The Indiana statute reads in part as follows: 
"If any child or other lineal descendant of such deceased 
person shall have been advanced by the deceased, by settlement or 
portion of real or personal estate, the value thereof shall be 
reckoned with that part of the surplus of the personal estate which 
shall remain to be distributed among the children. . . ."40~ 
Although that statute indicates that advancements can be deducted only 
from the personal estate, the Indiana court holds that the advancements 
are first equalized from the personal estate and, if that is impossible, 
the balance is deducted from the real estate.405 
In some jurisdictions the statute charging personal property as an 
advancement is separate and distinct from the statute charging real 
property as an advancement. In addition, the statute does not pro-
vide that if the advancement in personal estate exceeds the advancee' s 
share of the personal estate, it shall be deducted from his share of the 
real estate, but is silent on that point.406 Under a statute of that type 
if the advancement in personal property exceeds the advancee's share, 
the balance cannot be deducted from his share of the real property.497 
D. Computation of Advancements on the Distribution of an Estate 
Earlier we saw that advancements are treated as part of the estate 
of the intestate for the purpose of determining the amount to which 
Stat. (1949) §7058; Fla. Stat. (1941) §734.07; Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 1937) §113-1016; 
Iowa Code (1946) §636.44; Kan. Laws (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308; Ky. Rev. Stat. 
(1948) §391.140; Mass. Gen. Stat. (1932) c. 196, §3; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §475; 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §311; Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882-301; 
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2112; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §223; Pa. Stat. Ann: (Supp. 
1949) tit. 20, §1.9; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 567, §22; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1948) 
art. 2576; Va. Code Ann. (1950) §64-17; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §4094. 
402 Elliott v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739 (1889); Bemis v. Stearns, 16 Mass. 
200 (1819). 
403 Elliott v. Wilson, supra note 492. 
494 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §6-1503. 
-1osBamett v. Thomas, 36 Ind. App. 441, 75 N.E. 868 (1905). Cf. Dyer v. Arm-
strong, 5 Ind. 437 (1854). 
490 Cf. Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 61, §15; Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 75, §28. 
-101 South's Heirs v. Hoy's Heirs, 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) 88 (1825); Quinn v. Stock-
ton, 12 Ky. (2 Little) 343 (1822). 
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each heir is entitled. Suppose that an intestate, during his lifetime, 
gave one of his children $1500 and another $2000 as an advancement 
and did not make an advancement to any of his three other children. 
On his death his net estate to be distributed is valued at $50,000. If 
none of the children had received an advancement, each child would 
have received $10,000. In this case, since two of the children had 
received advancements, the amounts received by them are added to 
the $50,000, leaving a net estate of $53,500 subject to distribution. 
The $53,500 is then divided by five and each child is entitled to 
$10,700. Since one child received $1500 as an advancement, that 
sum is deducted from his share of the estate and he receives $9200. 
Since another child received $2000 as an advancement, that sum is 
deducted from his share and he receives $8700.498 
E. Duty of the Advancee to Account Where He Has Received by 
Way of Advancement More Than His Share of the Real and 
Personal Property 
Often an advancee receives by way of advancement more than his 
proportionate share of the advancor's estate. The problem is then 
presented as to whether he must refund the excess. In twenty-four 
states the problem is solved by legislative enactment. In those juris-
dictions the statute provides that if the advancement shall exceed the 
share of the heir, he shall be excluded from any further portion of 
the estate, but he shall not be required to refund any portion of such 
advancement.499 In other states the statute is silent on this subject 
but the cases hold that the advancee is not required to refund the 
excess.600 The reason for the rule is that an advancement is a com-
49SPitts v. Metzger, 195 Mo. App. 677, 187 S.W. 610 (1916); In re Laughlin's 
Estate, 157 Pa. Super. 166, 42 A. (2d) 173 (1945), reversed 354 Pa. 43, 46 A. (2d) 477 
• (1946); In re Hawley's Estate, 58 Montq. (Pa.) 285 (1942); Doverspike's Estate, 61 Pa. 
Super. 318 (1915); Gaylord v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 122 W.Va. 205, 8 S.E. (2d) 189 
(1940). 
499 Alii. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §15; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1051; 
Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §223; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §14-108; lli. Ann. Stat. 
(1947) c. 3, §166; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §2354; Iowa Code (1946) §636.44; 
Kan. Laws (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §5; Mass. Gen. 
Laws (1932) c. 196, §3; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178 (158); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
(1946) §525.53; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §91-413; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-113; 
Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882-302; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2113; 
Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-20; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §224; Ore. 
Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-302; S.D. Code (1939) §56.0115; Utah Code Ann. (1943) 
§101-4-19; Vt. Stat. (1947) §3067; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1349; Wis. Stat. 
(1947) §318.25. 
600 Farmer's Exchange Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 256 Ky. 160, 75 S.W. (2d) 
1063 (1934); Marston v. Lord, 65 N.H. 4, 17 A. 980 (1888); Gaylord v. Hope Natural 
Gas Co., 122 W.Va. 205, 8 S.E. (2d) 189 (1940). 
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pleted gift. Therefore, in the absence of an express provision in the 
statute, the courts will not infer that the legislature intended to require 
an advancee to refund any portion of such advancement.601 
Suppose an intestate, during his lifetime, gave two of his children 
$1000 each and his other child $10,000 as advancements. On his 
death his net estate to be distributed among his children is $15,000. 
In determining whether he is entitled to a share of the estate, the 
child who received the $10,000 advancement must add the two $1000 
advancements and the $10,000 to the $15,000 estate. When this 
is accomplished the estate is increased to $27,000 and each child would 
be entitled to one-third of the estate or $9000. Since one child had 
received $10,000 he cannot participate in the estate and he cannot 
be compelled to return the excess of $1000 to the estate. The $10,000 
is then deducted from the $27,000, leaving an estate of $17,000 to 
be distributed among the two other children. They are each entitled 
to one-half of the estate of $8500; but since each received $1000 
as an advancement, that amount is deducted from their share and they 
received $7500 each. 
F. Duty of a Grandchild to Account for an 
Advancement Made to His Parent 
Often a parent makes an advancement to one of his children who 
predeceases him leaving children of his own. Suppose that on the 
advancor' s death intestate, he is survived by two sons and the children 
of the deceased son. The problem is then presented as to whether 
the children of the deceased son are chargeable with advancements 
made to their father. In most jurisdictions they are, by statute, 
charged with advancements made to their parents.502 In those juris-
dictions where the statute does not expressly cover the subject, the 
u0l Marston v. Lord, supra note 500. -
u02AJa. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §18; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §116; Cal. 
Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1051; Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7058; D.C. Code 
(1940) §18-707; Fla. Stat. (1941) §734.07; Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 1937) §113-1016; 
Ill. Ann. Stat. (1947) c. 3, §166; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §6-1503; Kan. Laws 
(1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140; La. Civ. Code (1945) art. 
1240; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §6; Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 93, §133; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178 (162); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.53; Mont. Rev. 
Code Ann. (1947) §91-416; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-117; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) 
§3:5-2; N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law (1939) §85; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1941) 
§9882-305; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2116; Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-21; 
Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §227; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-306; S.C. Code Ann. 
(1942) §8909; S.D. Code (1939) §56-1118; Utah Code Ann. (1943) §101-4-22; Vt. Stat. 
(1947) §3069; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1353; Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.28. 
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courts hold that they take by right of representation and that, there-
fore, advancements made to their parents are chargeable to them.603 
Conversely, since the grandchildren take by representation, they can 
take advantage of advancements made to other children. Thus, if 
A makes an advancement of $1000 to his son B and makes no advance-
ment to his son C, and C dies before A, leaving issue, the children of 
Care entitled to have the transfer of $1000 to B charged as an advance-
ment. 504 
Suppose that A had three children, X, Y and Z, all of whom pre-
deceased him. He made an advancement to X but not to Y and Z. 
On his death intestate, the persons who are entitled to his estate are 
the children of X, Y and Z. Since they inherit per capita, the children 
of Y and Z are not entitled to have the advancement made to X charged 
as part of the share to which Xs children are entitled. In Louisiana, 
the problem is covered by statute.506 In other states, the result is 
reached by judicial decision.506 The authors of the Model Probate 
Code take the position that the grandchildren who inherit from their 
grandparent per capita should be charged with advancements made 
to their parents.507 
The rule, as disclosed by courts and legislative enactment, is, in 
the writer's opinion, preferable. The purpose of advancement statutes 
is to preserve equality among an advancor' s children. If he is survived 
by two children and the children of a deceased child who had received 
an advancement, equality can be preserved only by charging the chil-
dren of the deceased child with the value of the advancement. Ad-
vancement statutes are not designed to produce equality among grand-
503 Douglass v. Hammel, 313 Mo. 514, 285 S.W. 433 (1926); In re Williams• Estate, 
62 Mo. App. 339 (1895); Levering v. Rittenhouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 130 (1839); Earnest 
v. Earnest, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 213 (1835). Cf. Parker v. Eason, 213 N.C. 115, 195 S.E. 
360 (1938). 
504 Tison v. Tison, 12 Ga. 208 (1852); Beebe v. Estabrook, 79 N.Y. 246 (1879); 
Glessner's Estate, 40 Pa. D. and C. 271, 57 Montg. 78 (1940). 
505 La. Civ. Code (1945) art. 1240. . 
508 Brown v. Taylor, 62 Ind. 295 (1878); Skinner v. Wynne, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 
41 (1854); Person's Appeal, 74 Pa. (24 P.F. Smith) 121 (1873). Cf. In re Boss's Trust, 
L.R. 13 Eq. 286 (1871). In that case one-fifth of a testator's estate was to be distributed 
pursuant to the statute of distributions. At the time distribution was to take place all of his 
children were dead. Only two of them had children, but the issue of one child had died 
leaving a daughter. The issue of the other child were still alive. Held, that they inherit 
per stirpes and not per capita. Likewise, if an advancor's children all predeceased him and 
all the children of one child predeceased the advancor but one of them was survived by a 
child, advancements would be chargeable because the grandchildren and great-grandchild 
inherit per stirpes and not per capita. 
507 S:mms ..m1> BASYE, PRoBLEMs IN PROBATE LAw 67 (1946). 
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children and consequently advancements made to their parents should 
not be charged to them when they inherit per capita. 
XIII 
VALUATION OF Anv.ANCEMBNTS 
In most jurisdictions, by statute,608 and in states where there is no 
legislation dealing with valuation, the property is valued as of the date 
when the advancement was made.609 The reason for the rule is that 
the gift is complete when made. Therefore, to value the property as 
of another date may be unjust to the advancee or other heirs. This 
rule allows the advancee to take advantage of any enhancement in 
value and at the same time allows the other heirs to have a value placed 
on the property before it has had an opportunity to deteriorate. 
Such a rule protects an ambitious child who may through hard 
work and effort cause the property to enhance in value and, at the 
same time, it protects the other heirs against a child who may permit 
the property to decrease in value.610 
In South Carolina and Iowa the statute provides that advance-
uos Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §17; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §39-107; Ark. Stat. 
Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §118; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1052; D.C. Code (1940) 
§18-108; Fla. Stat. (1941) §734-07; Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §113-1017; Idaho Code 
Ann. (1932) §14-110; ID. Ann. Stat. (1947) c. 3, §166; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) 
§6-2355; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.3178 (161); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.531; 
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §475; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §91-415; Neb. Rev. Stat. 
(1943) §30-116; Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882-304; N.Y. Decedent's 
Estate Law (1939) §85; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2115; Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 
1940) §10503-19; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §226; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-305; 
S.D. Code (1939) §56.0117; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1948) art. 2576; Utah Code Ann. 
(1943) §101-4-21; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1352; Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.27; 15 
Geo. 5, c. 23, §47l(iii). Cf. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1949) tit. 20, §1.9. 
600 Turner v. Kelly, 67 Ala. 173 (1880). In that case, since the property had 
decreased in value, the advancee sought to have it valued as of the date the estate was 
settled. Dicken v. Fairchild, 215 Ky. 496, 284 S.W. 1101 (1926); Cochran v. Simmons, 
211 Ky. 16, 276 S.W. 989 (1925); Edwards v. Livesay, 203 Ky. 53, 261 S.W. 839 (1924); 
Myers v. Brown, 35 Ky. L. Rep. 240, 417, 97 S.W. 1110 (1906); Ford v. Ellingwood, 
60 Ky. 359 (1860); Warfield v. Warfield, 5 Har. and J. (Md.) 459 (1822); Shiver v. 
Brock, 2 Jones Eq. (N.C.) 137 (1855); Walton v. Walton, 7 Ired. Eq. (N.C.) 138 
(1850); Meadows v. Meadows, 11 Ired. L. (N.C.) 148 (1850); Lamb v. Carroll, 6 Ired. 
L. (N.C.) 4 (1849); Stalling3 v. Stallings, 1 Dev. Eq. (N.C.) 298 (1829); King v. Worsley, 
2 Hayw. (N.C.) 366 (1805); Oyster v. Oyster, 1 S. and R. (Pa.) 422 (1815); McKelvey v. 
Burrow, 89 Tenn. 101, 17 S.W. 1035 (1890); Burton v. Dickinson, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 112 
(1832); Ingram v. Ingram, 130 Va. 329, 107 S.E. 653 (1921); Puryear v. Cabell, 24 
Gratt. (Va.) 260 (1874); Beckwith v. Butler, 1 Wash. (Va.) 224 (1793); Isbell v. Butler, 
Jeff. (Va.) 10 (1735). 
610 Walton v. Walton, Meadows v. Meadows, Stallings v. Stallings, Oyster v. Oyster, 
Puryear v. Cabell, supra note 509. 
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ments are to be valued as of the date of the intestate's death.611 The 
Connecticut statute requires advancements to be valued as of the date 
of distribution.512 In these states, improvements placed on land by 
the advancee are not considered in arriving at its value.513 In M'Caw 
11. Blewit,514 the South Carolina court stated the rule for valuation 
in the following language: 
'The true intention of the law is, that the estate of the an-
cestor is to be considered as a common fund, out of which each 
child is to draw at the death an equal proportion. That part of 
the estate which has been given is to be estimated at what it is 
worth at the death, relation being had to its situation at the time 
of the gift. Thus a father gives to one of his sons a healthy negro 
boy of twelve years of age, and ten years after the gift the father 
dies. If this boy be brought into hotchpot, his value will be 
estimated as that of a boy of twelve years old; and whatever such 
a boy would then bring, the child is to be charged with as an 
advancement." 
The fallacy of this rule is best illustrated by several South Carolina 
cases decided after the Civil War. In those cases, a father, prior to 
the war, gave a slave to one of his children and died subsequent to 
the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation. The court held that 
since a slave was of no value at the intestate' s death, the child could 
not be charged with an advancement.515 Cases of this sort show the 
very injustice that may result when an advancement is valued at a time 
other than when made. 
Although the test for valuation of advancements appears to be very 
simple, the courts have had considerable difficulty in determining the 
date when an advancement was made. For instance, does the date 
of making mean the date when the advancee came into possession and 
enjoyment? The courts hold that it does.016 · 
611 Iowa Code (1946) §636.44; S.C. Code Ann. (1942) §8909; Eastwood v. Crane, 
125 Iowa 707, 101 N.W. 481 (1904); Finch v. Garrett, 102 Iowa 381, 71 N.W. 429 
(1897); M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) "'90 (1827); Hughey v. Eichelberger, 
11 S.C. 36 (1878); McClure v. Steele, 14 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 105 (1868); Youngblood v. 
Norton, 1 Strob. Eq. (S.C.) 122 (1845). 
512 Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat (1949) §7058. 
613 Eastwood v. Crane, 125 Iowa 707, 101 N.W. 481 (1904); M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 
McCord Eq. (S.C.) "'90 (1827). . 
514 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) "'90 at *104 (1827). 
516 Hughey v. Eichelberger, 11 S.C. 36 (1878); McClure v. Steele, 14 Rich. Eq. 
(S.C.) 105 (1868). In that case an intestate died in 1859 and settlement of his estate was 
postponed until aEter the Emancipation Proclamation. Held, that the date of death con-
trolled, and the value of slaves was charged to the advancee. 
616Wilk's Admr. v. Greer, 14 Ala. 437 (1848); Stevenson v. Martin, 74 Ky. (11 
Bush) 485 (1875); Hook v. Hook, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 526 (1853); Clark v. Wilson, 
27 Md. 693 (1867). 
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In accordance '\\rith that theory, the courts hold that where the 
advancor retains· a life estate the advancement is valued as of the date 
of his death.617 The North Carolina court does not reach a result in 
accord with this rule. In that state the court holds the advancee' s 
interest to be a vested remainder and values his interest as of the date 
of the conveyance.618 
If a parent conveys a life estate in real estate to a third person with 
a remainder to one of his children, the child is charged '\.vith an ad-
vancement.619 Where both _of the grantees survive the grantor, the 
courts have difficulty in ascertaining the value of the advancement. 
The settlement of the advancor's estate cannot be held in abeyance 
until the life tenant dies and the advancee comes into the possession 
and enjoyment of the property. For that reason the courts have been 
compelled to depart from the rule that an advancement is to be valued 
as of the date the advancee comes into possession and enjoyment. The 
value of the advancement is ascertained by taking the value of the 
property at the advancor's death and deducting the value of the life 
estate which is arrived at by the use of mortality tables.620 
In South Carolina, because the legislature had not adopted a 
mortality table, the court held that the value of an advancement con-
sisting of a vested remainder in real estate should be, in the absence 
of e.~treme youth or old age of the life tenant, one-half of the value 
of the fee.Im 
A parent may make a parol gift of land to a child and many years 
later deed it to him. If, on the parent's death, the other children 
attempt to charge the property as an advancement the court must 
determine whether the property should be valued as of the date the 
child entered into the possession and enjoyment of the property. Most 
courts hold that the land is to be valued as of the date the child enters 
into possession.622 However, some courts hold that the date of con-
veyance is the proper date for valuing the advancement.623 The basis 
lil7Wilk's Admr. v. Greer, supra note 516; Gossage v. Gossage's Admr., 281 Ky. 575, 
136 S.W. (2d) 775 (1940); Stevenson v. Martin, supra note 516; Hook v. Hook, supra 
note 516; Clark v. Wilson, supra note 516. 
GIB Raiford v. Raiford, 6 Ired. Eq. (N.C.) 490 (1849). 
GlOGossage v. Gossage's Admr., supra note 517; Cain v. Cain, 53 S.C. 350, 31 S.E. 
278 (1898). 
G2D Gossage v. Gossage's Admr., supra note 519. 
G21 Cain v. Cain, 53 S.C. 350, 31 S.E. 278 (1898). 
G22Pigg v. Carroll, 89 m. 205 (1878); McKelvey v. Burrow, 89 Tenn. 101, 17 S.W. 
1035 (1890); Ingram v. Ingram, 130 Va. 329, 107 S.E. 653 (1921). 
G23 Edwards v. Livesay, 203 Ky. 53, 261 S.W. 839 (1924); Barber v. Taylor's Heirs, 
39 Ky. (9 Dana) 84 (1839). Cf. Ford v. Ellingwood, 60 Ky. 359 (1860). 
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of the majority view is that the deed relates back to the date of the 
parol gift.524 . The theory of the minority decisions is that the grantor 
could change his mind and thereby annul the advancement.525 
Specific performance will be granted to enforce a parol gift of land 
if the donee has relied on the promise and made valuable improve-
ments. 526 Using this well-settled principle of law as a basis, the writer 
is of the opinion that the majority view is based on the more logical 
reason. Also, the efforts of the child may cause the land to increase 
in value and an injustice would be done if he were not permitted to 
take advantage of his efforts. Likewise, if the land depreciated in 
value because the child failed to care for it properly, the other children 
should not be penalized for his failure. 
Often an insurance policy is an advancement even though the 
right to change the beneficiary is reserved. Since the beneficiary does 
not come into possession · of and enjoyment of the proceeds of the 
policy until the death of the insured, he must account to his father's 
estate for the net amount received from the insurance policy.527 How-
ever, South Carolina reached a different result because of the peculiar 
features of its statute regarding valuation. In Rickenbacker v. Zim-
merman, 528 the court e.'\.'Plained its ruling in the following language: 
" . . . but the inquiry is, what a policy for a like amount, 
upon which the first premium has been paid, on the life of a 
person, with like expectation of life and of the same age as the 
father of appellant was when this policy was issued, be worth on 
the 12th of March, 1874, the date of the intestates death? 
" . . . inquiry should be what would such a policy be worth 
at the date of the death of the intestate in the condition in which 
this one was at the time when it was issued, that being the time 
when the gift was made. • . ." 
"The question as to the payment by the father of the pre-
miums subsequent to the fust presents more difficulty; but we 
are inclined to regard them as advancements of so much money: 
like the case of the father who, after having given his child a piece 
of property-a residence, for example,-expends considerable 
524 Pigg v. Carroll, 89 lli. 205 (1878); Ingram v. Ingram, 130 Va. 329, 107 S.E. 653 
(1921). 
525 See note 523 supra. 
· 526 Lindell v. Lindell, 135 Minn. 368, 160 N.W. 1031 (1917); Seavey v. Drake, 62 
N.H. 393 (1892); McCLINToCK, EQUITY §57, p. 91 (1936). 
527 Culberhouse v. Culberhouse, 68 Ark. 405, 59 S.W. 38 (1900); Cazassa v. Cazassa, 
92 Tenn. 573, 22 S.W. 560 (1893). 
52810 S.C. 110 at 119-120 (1877). 
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sums of money from year to year in making improvements or 
additions to the buildings. In such a case, the thing given is the 
money expended; and while it is true that ordinarily the sum 
expended does not furnish the rule for estimating the value of 
an advancement, yet where, as in this case, the thing given is 
money, there is no other mode of estimating its value except by 
th . " e amount given. 
Statutes in some states expres!ily recognize the right of the advancor 
and advancee to agree upon the value of the advancement. 629 In those 
states the value must be set forth in writing. The valuation may be 
set out in the conveyance or in an instrument executed by the decedent 
or in the written aclmowledgment of the advancee. If the value is 
specified in any of these ways, the courts charge the advancee with 
the amount specified in the instrument. In Georgia, an instrument 
setting forth the value of an advancement is prima facie evidence.530 
In jurisdictions which do not have statutes permitting the advancor 
to establish conclusively the value of the property, the courts hold 
that the parties can agree on the valuation of the property.631 In Ladd 
11. Stephens532 the intestate gave certain bank stock worth $9200 to 
one of his sons. In a written instrument he valued the stock at $5000, 
its par value. The court held that the valuation fixed by a parent on 
advancements to his children at the time the advancements were made, 
should control in determining the amount with which they were to be 
charged in settlement of his estate. 
The writer can find no quarrel with the court's decision in Ladd 
v. Stephens. However, the broad rule announced by that decision 
can be carried too far. Suppose a parent gives a child property worth 
$5000 and without his lmowledge charges him with $10,000 as an 
advancement. Under such circumstances the child should be charged 
111.rith $5000. He did not agree to the value and did not lmow of the 
529 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §17; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §118; Cal. 
Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1052; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §14-110; ill. Ann. Stat. 
(1947) c. 3, §166; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §5; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178 
(161); Minn. Stat. Ann (1946) §525-531; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §91-415; Nev. 
Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882-304; N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law (1939) §85; 
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2115; Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-19; Okla. 
Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §226; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-305; S.D. Code (1939) 
§56-0117; Utah Code Ann. (1943) §101-4-21; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1352; 
Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.27; Hilton v. Hilton, 103 Me. 92, 68 A. 595 (1907); Smith v. 
Smith, 59 Me. 214 (1871); Power v. Power's Estate, 91 Mich. 587, 52 N.W. 60 (1892). 
530 Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §113-1017; Sims v. Sims, 39 Ga. 109 (1869). 
631 Safe-Deposit and Trust Co. v. Baker, 91 Md. 297, 46 A. 1071 (1900); Ladd v. 
Stephens, 147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 915 (1898). 
532147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 915 (1898). 
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writing. The only logical conclusion is that he accepted the property 
knowing that he would be charged with its actual value. 
In Kentucky and South Carolina if a parent dies intestate his 
children must account for all absolute gifts as advancements. The 
only way he can avoid the statute is to give away all of his property 
in his lifetime or dispose of it by will. Consequently, he cannot, in 
writing or otherwise, place a value on an advancement. To allow him 




A. Before the Death of the Advancor 
Advancements to children may be made many years before the 
advancor's death. One might well argue that since the advancee had 
the use of the property for a long time he should be compelled to pay 
interest. This contention has been made on numerous occasions and 
has always been rejected by the courts.534 All courts hold that interest 
is not chargeable between the date of the advancement and the date 
of the advancor' s death. The following reasons are given as a basis 
for the rule: (1) an advancement is not a loan or borrowed capital, 
and if the courts treated it as such, advancees would never be willing 
to accept property from their parents;636 (2) the advancee runs the 
risk of loss, so he should be entitled to any increment in value, and 
if interest is charged, the increase in value would be reduced;536 (3) 
over a period of years the interest would amount to more than the 
advancement;537 and ( 4) an advancement is an absolute gift.538 The 
West Virginia court in Kyle 11. Conrad,539 eJ..-pressed the rule as fol-
lo:ws: 
"Advancements are generally made to enable the child to 
engage with advantage at the proper age in the occupation by 
533 Hook v. Hook, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 526 (1853). 
534 Towles v. Roundtree, IO Fla. 299 (1874); Boyd v. White, 32 Ga. 530 (1861); 
Osgood v. Breed's Heirs, 17 Mass. 356 (1821); In re Howlett's Estate, 275 Mich. 596, 267 
N.W. 743 (1936); Tart v. Tart, 154 N.C. 502, 70 S.E. 929 (1911); In re French's Estate, 
268 N.Y. 370, 197 N.E. 316 (1935); In re Smith's Estate, 350 Pa. 418, 39 A. (2d) 513 
(1944); Hillman v. Hillman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 135 S.W. (2d) 802; Kyle v. Conrad, 
25 W.Va. 760 (1885). 
535 Osgood v. Breed's Heirs, supra note 534. 
536 Nelson v. Wyan, 21 Mo. 347 (1855). · 
537 Towles v. Roundtree, supra note 534; Osgood v. Breed's Heirs, supra note 534. 
538Part ll(B)(4), 51 MICH. L. R:sv. 665 at 679 (1953). 
539 25 W.Va. 760 (1885), quoting from Knight v. Yarborough, 4 Rand. (Va.) 566 
• at 569 (1826). 
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which he expects to make his living. If each child is advanced 
at the same age to the same amount, each is advanced equally, 
although one be advanced twenty years before the other, each 
having the same capital advanced for his establishment in life." 
The courts, in construing wills charging gifts as advancements, 
apply the advancement rule and hold that interest is not chargeable 
between the date of the will and the date of the advancement.Mo unless 
the testamentary instrument directs that a charge be made.641 
B. After the Death of the Advancor 
Because the estate of a deceased person vests in his heirs or legal 
representatives at his death the courts hold that interest is chargeable 
on advancements after the advancor's death.642 However, the date 
of death is not always the day on which interest begins to run. Some 
courts allow interest from the date of the advancor's death to the date 
that an order of distribution should be entered.643 Other courts hold 
that interest does not begin to run until a reasonable time has expired 
for the settlement of the estate,644 and a third group allows interest to 
be charged from the day the advancor died to the day the order for 
final distribution is entered.546 
54.0 Harris v. Allen, 18 Ga. 177 (1855); In re Howlett's Estate, 275 Mich. 596, 267 
N.W. 743 (1936); Nelson v. Wyan, 21 Mo. 347 (1855); Bro'IVD. v. Bro'IVD, 72 N.J. Eq. 
667, 65 A. 739 (1907); In re French's Estate, 268 N.Y. 370, 197 N.E. 316 (1935); 
Jackson v. Jackson, 25 Tenn. App. 198, 154 S.W. (2d) 797 (1939). 
li41 In re Palmer's Estate, 194 Iowa 611, 190 N.W. 30 (1922); Sprague v. Moore, 130 
Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902). Cf. Brown v. Brown, supra note 540; Hillman v. Hill-
man, (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 135 S.W. (2d) 802. 
G42 Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §113-1017; Dfa:on v. Marston, 64 N.H. 433, 14 A. 
728 (1887); Wysong v. Rambo, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899) 56 S.W. 1053; McKelvey v. 
Burrow, 89 Tenn. 101, 17 S.W. 1035 (1890); Knight v. Oliver, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 33 
(1855); Gaylord v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 122 W.Va. 205, 8 S.E. (2d) 189 (1940). 
li43 Jackson v. Jackson, 25 Tenn. App. 198, 154 S.W. (2d) 797 (1939) (18 months). 
Cf. Luneford v. Yarbrough, 189 N.C. 476, 127 S.E. 426 (1925). 
G44. Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §113-1017; Towles v. Roundtree, 10 Fla. 299 (1874); 
Sims v. Sims, 39 Ga. 108 (1869); Boyd v. White, 32 Ga. 530 (1861); Harris v. Allen, 
18 Ga. 177 (1855); Tart v. Tart, 154 N.C. 502, 70 S.E. 929 (1911) (2 years); In re 
Thompson's Estate, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 292 (1880); In re Shurf's Estate, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 
360 (1880); In re Ford's Estate, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 97 (1875) (1 year). 
li46 Wysong v. Rambo, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899) 56 S.W. 1053. In that case a child 
could have had the estate divided at any time after his father's death and the advancements 
made to his brothers then settled. He made no effort to do so for twenty-two years. Held, 
that he cannot claim interest from his brothers on their advancements for that length of 
time. The court allowed interest for two years, since that was a reasonable time for the 
settlement of the estate. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of advancements was unknown to the common law 
but is a creature of statute. The statutes of each state determine its 
force and effect as a legal doctrine. The £rst advancement statute 
was a part of the English Statute of Distributions of 1670.546 All 
American jurisdictions, except New Mexico, have advancement stat-
utes, many of which are patterned after that English statute. 
Most statutes provide that the advancement concept applies to 
parent and child. Other statutes describe the parties to whom the 
doctrine is applicable as follows: "grandparent and grandchild," "child 
or lineal descendant," "children and their issue," "heirs," "children 
and other descendants," "descendant or collateral," "descendant," "any 
person to whom the decedent's property would pass in case of intes-
" d" , " , tacy, an any person. 
The Model Probate Code547 applies to any person "who, if the 
intestate had died at the time of making the advancement, would be 
entitled to inherit a part of his estate." Under such provision advance-
ments may be chargeable to a surviving spouse or collateral relatives. 
Advancements are almost always made to children. On some 
occasions they are made to grandchildren and on only rare occasions 
are they made to a surviving spouse or other heirs. Since the doctrine 
is designed to produce equality among the advancor' s children, it should 
not be extended to include other heirs of the advancor. However, an 
exception to this rule should be made in favor of the advancor' s grand-
children, who can only be charged with advancements when they are 
received after their parents' death. A different rule would tend to 
defeat the equality among the advancor' s children. 
The courts state that the purpose of the statutes of descent is to 
make such a will for an intestate as he would have been most likely to 
make for himself. In Edwards v. Freeman,548 Lord Chief Justice 
Raymond said, " . . . the statute of distribution . . . makes such a 
will for the intestate, as a father, free from the partiality of affections, 
would himself make .... " In carrying out this idea, that the statute 
of descents-including the statute on advancements-is designed to 
make such a will as the intestate himself would make, the courts, in 
546 22 and 23 Charles II, c. 10 (1670). 
547 Model Probate Code §29, S:mms AND BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAw 65-66 
(1949). 
5482 P. Wms. 436, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 (1727). 
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all American jurisdictions but Kentucky and South Carolina hold that 
the intent of the advancor determines whether a voluntary inter vivas 
transfer is a gift or an advancement. Underlying these decisions is the 
fundamental American doctrine that a man may dispose of his property 
as he chooses. In determining whether a voluntary inter vivas transfer 
is a gift or advancement the court places itself in the place of the 
intestate and seeks to ascertain whether he would have charged the 
transfer as a gift or advancement. 
In England, since passage of the Administration of Estates Act 
of 1925, the advancor's intent'49 is determinative. Prior to that time 
the cases cast a great deal of doubt on the role the advancor's intent 
played in determining whether a transfer of property was a gift or an 
advancement. Although none of the cases are squarely in point, they 
indicate that prior to 1925 the advancor's intent was immaterial. 
In South Carolina, by judicial decision, and in Kentucky, by statute, 
the intent of the advancor is regarded as immaterial. However, in both 
states the advancor's intent is material where the sum sought to be 
charged as an advancement was expended. for the maintenance or 
education of a child. 
In most states, the courts, by judicial decision, indulge in the 
presumption that all substantial voluntary inter vivos transfers made 
by an intestate in his lifetime are prima fade advancements. The rule 
is based on the idea that the natural affection of a parent is as strong 
for one child as for another. For that reason, a parent will treat all 
of his children equally so that all of them will share equally in all that 
comes from him. 
In Texas and in Connecticut, when the property involved is per-
sonalty, the presumption is that all substantial voluntary inter vivos 
transfers are presumed to be gifts rather than advancements. The 
authors of the Model Probate Code550 have incorporated the Texas 
rule into this proposed advancement statute. That provision of the 
Model Probate Code reads as follows: "Every gratuitous inter vivos 
transfer is deemed to be an absolute gift and not an advancement unless 
shown to be an advancement." 
The Model Probate Code551 presumption provision is a great 
improvement over the existing rule. If an intestate intends for his 
children to share equally in his estate he would either (1) attach con-
ditions to the voluntary transfer so it would be an advancement or 
549 15 Geo. 5, c. 23 (1925). 
Guo Srr.ms .AND BASYE, PROBLEMS m PROBATE LAw (1949). 
uulJbid. 
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(2) execute a will charging the voluntary transfer as an advancement. 
By electing to do neither of these things, the logical assumption is that 
he did not desire to charge the voluntary transfer as an advancement. 
Even if advancement statutes were abolished and all advancements 
were required to be charged by will, intestates would continue to make 
advancements, and misunderstanding among the heirs of persons dying 
intestate would be increased. The danger of family quarrels created 
by existing legislation can be decreased by enactment of a presumption 
provision similar to that of the Model Probate Code652 and by restricting 
the persons to whom the doctrine is applicable to children and grand-
children. 
562Ibid. 
